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Abstract 
 
The Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) regime adopted by any country is essentially a tool that 
strives to ensure both the growth of the domestic pharmaceutical industry and people’s access to 
medicines. But, contrary to the very easily advanced theory, there is no paradox between the two. 
From this perspective, the Indian experience has shown that it is precisely the relaxation of its 
national IPR regime that promoted the growth of its domestic industry, thereby ensuring a better 
patient access to medicines. However, the globalisation process does not overlook any sector, 
which means that medicines too are submitted to the new legal framework established within the 
WTO. To understand better the stakes involved in the ratification of the TRIPS agreement in 
India, this paper addresses several issues. It begins by establishing that opting for the intellectual 
property regime is not without consequences. It determines the extent of progress achieved in the 
industrial and health sectors both in the developed as well as developing countries. Then, it 
analyses how the TRIPS agreement establishes a strong IPR system that aims to reconcile 
protection of innovation and public health promotion by providing for “exceptions” at the global 
level. Finally, after having dealt in detail with Indian reticence and tardiness in making its 
legislation TRIPS compatible, the paper presents the prospects available presently for India.  
 
1. Introduction 
The rationale behind patenting of an invention can be traced to the community of interests 
between the society and the inventor. For the society, it means that an individual can be 
guaranteed access to new therapies that are safe and effective and obtain disclosures of an 
invention to promote innovation. For the inventor, he gets the benefits in the form of a monopoly 
on the use of the patented product or process. Certainly, patents are an incentive for innovation in 
a sector where processes and products are the fruit of expensive research and development 
(R&D) programmes, which often expose companies to problems of appropriation (Arrow, 1962, 
Demsetz, 1967)3. Thus, interests albeit not conflicting but nevertheless divergent in nature are 
brought into play. The society as a whole and more particularly the consumers would prefer that 
patents be issued for a limited period and monopoly granted in proportion to the benefit brought 
by the inventor. On the other hand, the inventors would prefer patents granting a wide-ranging 
and long lasting monopoly that would provide them with a profit that far exceeds the investment 
in R&D (Scherer, 1998, Grabowsky, 2002, Sterckx, 2004).  
This compromise between diverging interests was always at the heart of changes made in 
patent protection in the developed countries. Initially, these countries granted patents on 
processes alone in order to ensure the innovation’s diffusion, a necessary condition for the 
growth of a competitive pharmaceutical industry. Later, from the fifties onwards, they ratified 
product patents (Remiche & Desterbecq, 1996, Mfuka, 2002)4. Finally, bowing to constant 
pressure from the pharmaceutical industry, the term of a patent was extended to twenty years in 
developed countries. As of the same period, we witness in the history of patents a new phase of 
extending patenting on a global level, especially to the developing countries (Braga, 1989).  
In fact, the round of negotiation launched in 1986 at Punta del Este sought to extend the 
GATT trade regime to new sectors such as trade in services and intellectual property. This round 
lasted eight years. It culminated in the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
and the ratification of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) at Marrakech in April 19945. Beginning 1st January 1996, the developed countries are to 
amend their national legislation to comply with TRIPS. However, a moratorium is to be provided 
for the rest of the world: twenty years for the least advanced countries and ten years for 
developing countries and countries transiting towards a market economy.  
Since then, there has been sharp questioning and criticism. While it has been constantly 
reminded that the agreement is not inconsistent with the legitimate aims of industrial 
development and public health, especially of the developing countries, there have been 
 
3 In fact, companies experienced great difficulties in obtaining maximum benefit of their R&D activities and seemed 
unable to recover the considerable sum invested in the development of new treatment. They were under the constant 
threat of their competitors copying their products. So, it appears that in the absence of a suitable “institutional 
arrangement” (Arrow, 1962) the companies were evidently not inclined to allocate funds for their R&D, which 
resulted in the lowering of general welfare, as access to the latest innovations was being compromised.  
4To cite a few examples, the United Kingdom introduced a patent on medicines in 1949, France in 1959 and 
Switzerland in 1977.  
5 The framework of international negotiations on intellectual property rights had thus shifted from the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), a specialised technical organisation, to the WTO vested with a larger 
mandate, but literally and definitely driven by trade considerations.  
expressions of acute fear and sharp protests from Brazil, India and even the “African group” 
within the WTO. The flexibility provided for in the agreement fail to reassure the developing 
countries. The main aim of this article is precisely to shed light on the ins and outs of the 
extension of IPR to the developing countries. We will especially deal with Indian fears: step by 
step (and with delay), India is currently amending the patent law to comply with TRIPS.  
To understand better the stakes involved in the ratification of the TRIPS agreement in India, 
we will begin by establishing that opting for the intellectual property regime is not without 
consequences. It determines the extent of progress achieved in the industrial and health sectors 
both in the developed as well as developing countries (§2). Then, we shall see how the TRIPS 
agreement establishes a strong IPR system that aims to reconcile protection of innovation and 
public health promotion by providing for “exceptions” at the global level (§3)6. Finally, after 
having dealt in detail with Indian reticence and tardiness in making its legislation TRIPS 
compatible (§4), we will analyse the prospects available presently for India (§5).  
2. Industrial development and betterment of public health: the importance of the IPR 
regime  
In one century, India has been a witness to two IPR systems. The passage from one to the 
other has markedly changed its industrial path as regards domestic pharmaceutical production. 
From a strong IPR system (process and product patents), in which the local industry was only at 
the fledgling stage, the country changed course to a weak IPR system (process patents) that 
allowed the dynamic pharmaceutical industry to grow. After all, the country’s self sufficiency in 
healthcare vastly improved.  
2.1. First, a strong IPR regime  
Historically the growth of Indian pharmaceutical industry started during the colonial period 
(Felker & alii, 1997, Smith, 2000) with the founding of the Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical 
Works in 1901, the King Institute of Preventive Medicine (tropical diseases research centre) in 
1904 and the Pasteur Institute in 1907. From the Second World War onwards, India started 
producing conventional medicines (serums and vaccines). The country also commenced 
manufacturing synthetic products to treat dysentery and leprosy. Later several government 
production units were established: Hindustan Antibiotics in 1954 with technical assistance from 
the WHO and UNICEF as well as Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals with technical support from 
the erstwhile USSR (Felker & alii, 1997, Smith, 2000, Dubey, 2003). Despite these forays 
following India’s independence, the local pharmaceutical industry was still nascent and the 
country was heavily dependant on external supplies.  
Faced with continuing dependence, experts found fault with the IPR regime inherited from the 
colonial days. In fact, patent policy dated back to 1856. The Indian Patent Act (IPA) amended in 
1911 authorised issuing of both process and product patents. These patents were valid for a 
period of sixteen years and could be extended for another period of ten years if the patent holder 
believed that he had not been adequately defrayed for his innovation (Lalitha, 2002a). As of 
1948-1950, the Patent Enquiry Committee specified that “the Indian patent system has failed in 
its main purpose, namely to stimulate inventions among Indians and to encourage the 
development and exploitation of new inventions for industrial purposes in the country so as to 
 
6The reinforcement of the IPR regime in the world is taking place at a time when the World Health Organisation 
(WHO), another international institution, has launched a programme promoting people’s access to essential drugs, as 
these medicines go a long way in treating diseases that are the most prevalent in developing countries.  
secure the benefits thereof to the largest section of the public” (Government of India, 1949, cited 
by Ramanna, 2002).  
At the end of the sixties, a second committee confirmed this finding: the IPR regime was a 
tool in the hands of the multinational companies (MNCs) of the developed world to keep the 
Indian market exclusively for themselves. They held between 80 to 90% of the patents. Having 
cornered monopolistic positions, they indulged in prohibitive prices, which were among the 
highest in the world (Mittal, 1993, Keayla, 1995, Watal, 2001, Ramanna, 2002). Based on the 
findings of an enquiry on the price of 18 essential drugs, this committee pointed out that most 
often the same products were cheaper abroad. Therefore, it recommended the amendment of the 
existing IPR regime and the establishment of a new “institutional arrangement” (Arrow, 1962) 
that was more flexible and permitted a “fair-selling price”. All these institutional modifications 
were supposed to encourage the development of a high-performance domestic industry capable of 
making the country’s self-sufficient in healthcare and reduce the price of medicines.  
2.2. Followed by a relaxation of the IPR regime with positive effects  
In 1970, the patent law was relaxed. The 1970 IPA stipulated that patents would be granted 
only for processes for a period of seven years as regards the pharmaceutical industry7.
Furthermore, a company would only be able to enjoy one patent for one manufacturing process 
(Lalitha, 2002a). From then on medicines were exempted from the scope of patentability8.
Besides, only local production would validate the effective use of a patent. Contrary to the 
earlier practice, the import of pharmaceutical products no longer allowed the patent’s effective 
use to be validated. As a result, the patent holder was given three years to exercise his right in the 
form of local production.  
The IPA also provided for assignment of rights. If, at the end of the three-years period, a 
medicine was not available or at a reasonable price, the Indian government could construe that 
the public need had not been met and could issue a compulsory license (CL). It could thus allow 
a local company to manufacture the medicine and market it at a lower price. A fortiori, if two 
years after the issue of the CL, the medicine was still not available, the government could simply 
revoke the patent due to lack of satisfactory usage.  
Along with industrial policy measures, the public authorities instituted price control in the 
same year. The Drug Price Control Orders (DPCO) was established in 1970 in order to enhance 
people’s access to drugs (Singh, 1985, Felker & alii, 1997, Srinivasan, 2001, OPPI, 2001, 
Kunnapallil, 2003). In practice, the public authorities published a list of the most essential drugs 
with a large volume of sale. Henceforth, the retail price of these drugs was fixed at a reasonable 
level. This price was supposed to enable manufacturers cover the cost of raw materials, 
formulation, packaging and distribution while at the same time ensuring a reasonable profit 
margin. The price for most essential drugs was fixed in such a way as to ensure a margin of 75% 
taking into account various production costs for the company. The margin for non-essential drugs 
 
7 Seven years from the patent application date or 5 years from the date of obtaining the patent.  
8 In the vital nuclear, agriculture and food supply sectors patenting has been totally banned. We should remember 
that by adopting short-term process patents, India was but following the example set by the developed countries, 
which belatedly opted for a more relaxed IPR to encourage the growth of national champions based on a sufficiently 
large reserved domestic market and enhance healthcare self-sufficiency in their country (Mfuka, 2002).  
was fixed at 150%. Later, this price control system underwent recurrent changes (Gross, 1999, 
Govindaraj & Chellaraj, 2002, Lalitha, 2002a, 2002b)9.
Thus, the 1970 IPA along with the DPCO, sought to reconcile the aims of diffusing innovation 
in the country and fulfilling the needs of people as regards quality drugs at affordable prices 
(Keayla, 1995). Since only processes could be patented, at that time it was possible for local 
companies to copy molecules developed by MNCs. Working on the basis of reverse engineering 
and learning by copying, these companies could market generic drugs or less expensive versions 
of drugs patented by MNCs elsewhere.  
Coming into force in 1972, this new IPR regime had a substantial impact. First of all, it 
allowed the growth of the fragmented domestic pharmaceutical industry. In 1953, the sector 
consisted of 1,752 companies as against 5,126 in 1980. Today, there are 20,000 companies with 
250 big timers and about ten public sector enterprises (Mittal, 1993, OPPI, 2002)10.
Moreover, the country was able to make good its backwardness as regards domestic 
production of raw material and formulations. Raw material production rose from 180 million 
rupees in 1965 to 9 billion rupees in the early nineties and rose further to 45 billion in 2001. As 
for formulation, it recorded an even higher growth. At the end of the sixties, the industry 
formulated drugs worth 1.5 billion rupees. This turnover went up to 60 billion rupees in 1993 and 
settled at above 183 billion in 2001 (Mittal, 1993, OPPI, 2002).  
As of the 1980s, the pharmaceutical industry’s exports to the rest of the world have gone up. 
Initially, these exports mainly concerned finished products: 76% as against 24% of raw material 
exports. Later, considerable growth in the export of both raw materials as well as finished 
products was observed at the end of the nineties. Indeed, exports increased respectively more 
than 100 times and more than 300 times during this period. Finally, a more even distribution of 
exports in this sector was observed: 55% of exports pertained to formulation as against 45% for 
active substances in 2000 (Mittal, 1993, OPPI, 2002)11. Besides, the dynamism of exports 
manifested in a trade surplus right from the end of the eighties. Thus, the chronic deficits between 
the 1960s and 1980s began to decrease and disappear as of 1989. Today, the pharmaceutical 
sector trade surplus is nearly 51.3 billion rupees (IDMA, 2001, Chaudhry, 2002)12.
Since the 1970 IPA, Indian pharmaceutical industry’s growth has meant enhanced self-
sufficiency as far as the country’s healthcare is concerned. The industry produces 70% of raw 
material and 80% of finished products in the Indian market (Lanjouw, 1997). In addition, the 
grading of the top 10 companies in the Indian market reveals the performance of the domestic 
 
9 At present, drugs with a sales volume higher than 1 million dollars or which hold monopoly over the market come 
under the purview of the DPCO. Monopoly here means a medicine that has a turnover of more than 250,000 dollars 
and is supplied by a single manufacturer with at least 90% of the market share. Medicines for which competitive 
pressure is deemed to be sufficient are exempt from this purview: at least five raw material manufacturers and ten 
finished product manufacturers who have each less than 40% of market share either for raw material or the finished 
product.  
10 At present, the sector directly employs 250,000 persons and indirectly 750,000 individuals, especially in 
distribution (Felker & alii, 1997).  
11 This phenomenon can be explained by the very high taxation imposed by the Indian government on the import of 
finished products, which in turn induces domestic production of these products.  
12 Indian industry exports a large chunk to the developed markets, especially to the United States. Generic drug 
manufacture has grown by leaps and bounds impelled by the public authorities seeking to bring healthcare 
expenditure under control.  
industry. Four of these companies are from India and have almost 16% share of the Indian market 
(OPPI, 2002).  
Moreover, comparison between the drug price index and the price index of other goods 
between 1961 and 1989 evidences the positive effect of the DPCO. In the beginning of the 
sixties, the drug price index was almost at par with the general price index: 2% inflation for drugs 
as against 3% for all other goods. Till 1966, a restrained price increase for drugs as compared to 
other goods could be noted - an effect that could be attributed to the first steps taken towards drug 
price control during the Sino-Indian war (Singh, 1985, Felker & alii, 1997). Then, from 1970s 
onwards, the gap between the drug price index and the price index of other goods began to widen. 
In general, between 1961 and 1989, the price index for all products increased by 676.6% as 
against 386.6% for drugs (Government of India, Indian Drug Statistics, cited by Chandra Prasad 
& Bhat, 1993).  
We should dwell a little further on this point. When we compare the relative prices of some of 
the essential drugs 16 years after the DPCO came into force, we notice that the prices in India 
were among the lowest in 1986. Of eight essential drugs belonging to seven therapeutic 
classifications, Mittal (1993) maintained that the Indian prices were lower than the prices 
prevalent in countries like Pakistan or the United Kingdom. For example, the price of an 
antibiotic in India was 82.5% of the price in Pakistan and 32.2% of the price in Britain. For the 
most expensive drug, a hypertensive drug, the Indian price was equivalent to approximately 69% 
of the British price and 42% of the Pakistani price. Similarly, according to a study conducted by 
Keayla (1995) on the prices of largest selling drugs during the years 1991 and 1992, India 
enjoyed attractive prices. For an antibiotic (Ciprofloxacin), the Indian price was 5.66 times lower 
than the Pakistani price. Even for an ulcer drug (Ranitidine), the American price was 25 times 
higher than the Indian price.  
Recently, the presence of Indian pharmaceutical firms has been highly appreciated and 
received wide coverage in the media for the supply of antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) at competitive 
prices in the developing world.  
2.3. Global effect of a relaxed IPR regime: Indian competition and prices of ARV  
ARV production began in India in 1991. At that time, Cipla wisely had a go at the 
manufacturing of the less costly ARV formulations, whose active substance content was low and 
whose manufacturing process was relatively less complex13. A decade later, there were on the 
whole five Indian companies (Cipla, Ranbaxy, Hetero, Aurodindo and Cadila) who had 
developed the wherewithal for this formulation and this allowed each one of them to market more 
than fifteen ARVs especially in the form of double and triple therapies.  
The entry of these generic drugs in the ARV market brought the cost of treatment crashing 
down. For the price of a therapy combining three ARVs, Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) (2003) 
clearly demonstrated that the sharp decline started with Cipla announcement in February 2001 
that it would sell its triple therapy in the form of a cocktail at $350 per year per patient to non- 
governmental organisations (NGOs)14. At that time, a triple therapy cost $931 with brand-name 
 
13 In practice, generic drug manufacturers confess that they are not much inclined to market ARV whose production 
costs are very high, or whose active substance content is very high or whose manufacturing process is complex.  
14 A cocktail is a treatment composed of three drugs that are present in a single pill to be taken 2 or 3 times a day. 
This innovative dosage brings down the number of pills to be taken every day and improves patient compliance 
(WHO, 2002).  
medicines. From March 2001, the price of triple therapy with brand-name drugs fell to $727. 
Moreover, competition between Indian generic drug manufacturers triggered a new decline in 
prices. Two months after Cipla’s announcement, Hetero joined the fray and declared its intention 
to sell its cocktail at $347 to NGOs. Few months later, Ranbaxy raised the stakes by fixing the 
price of its cocktail at $295 for NGOs. In its last report, MSF states that prices are still 
decreasing. Last year, Hetero was selling the tri-therapy at $152 to NGOs against $562 for brand-
name drugs. Thus, between January 2001 and June 2005, the price of the triple therapy fell by 
more than 83% thanks to the most effective means of lowering medicines price, i.e. generic 
competition (MSF, 2006).  
On the whole, the beneficial effects of a relaxed IPR regime (patents on manufacturing 
processes alone) were confirmed as seen in the Indian experiment. By making its IPR regime 
more flexible, India had encouraged the growth of a pharmaceutical industry and improved 
accessibility to drugs. Further, this high-performance industry had recently succeeded in pushing 
ARV prices down and improving accessibility. As a WTO Member, India has to amend its laws 
by 2005 to make them TRIPS compliance. What is the content of this agreement and what impact 
can it have on the Indian trajectory as regards pharmaceutical development and access to 
treatment? To answer these questions, it is imperative to spell out clearly the contents of this 
agreement.  
3. Strengthening of the IPR regime at the international level: Patentability under the 
terms of the TRIPS agreement  
The TRIPS agreement attempts to reduce the differences in the manner by which IPR is 
protected around the world by fixing a minimum level of intellectual property protection that 
each of the WTO’s member-states ought to guarantee. Thus, Articles 17 and 34 of this agreement 
lay down common minimum international regulations. These regulations specify what is 
patentable, what is not patentable and the extent to which the rights are protected under the patent 
(Gervais, 1999, Boulet & Velasquez, 1999).  
3.1. General provisions  
First of all, the agreement defines the patent as “any invention, whether products or processes, 
in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, and involve an inventive step”, (…), “that 
they are capable of industrial application” or it be “non-obvious and useful” (Article 27.1 and the 
linked footnote).  
As regards the patent’s term, it is fixed at a minimum of 20 years from the date of its 
application (Article 33). In this respect, the industrialised countries’ standard has prevailed. 
Indeed, the lengthy administrative procedures to determine the product’s safety and effectiveness 
before marketing approval (MA) tended to eat so much into the effective duration of the patent15.
As quid pro quo, the American authorities, on one side and the European authorities, on the 
other, granted an extension of the patent term to 20 years.  
As regards patent validity, Article 27 lays down that “patent rights shall be enjoyable without 
discrimination, (…), whether products are imported or locally produced”. In other words, 
whereas the national laws of developing countries such as India and Thailand stipulated that local 
 
15 The time taken between the patent application as such and the obtaining of a MA can add up to several years, 
which brings down by as much the effective monopoly granted by the patent and eats into the pharmaceutical firms’ 
profit meant to cover R&D expenditure.  
production alone could validate a patent, henceforth import would also validate the actual use of 
the patent. Thus, WTO Member states no longer had any discriminatory tools to encourage 
access to technology and medicines.  
3.2. Patentability conditions  
The issue of patentability conditions, in other words the patentability criteria (positive and 
negative), is not merely technical. These criteria define what can be appropriated by private 
parties and what cannot be monopolised or withdrawn from free use. These criteria formalise the 
old social contract between the community and the inventor.  
As per article 27.1, the member states are beholden to offer protection granted by a patent for 
any invention whether it is a product (medicine) or a process (a method to produce chemical 
ingredients for a drug composition). Thus, whereas a number of developing countries had opted 
for patenting only the process, henceforth they are bound to grant patents both for the process and 
the product under certain conditions.  
First condition, the process or product should establish its novelty. The agreement does not 
give any details on this point. However, it is generally considered any thing not previously 
included in a technique is new. Therefore, any previously unknown invention regardless of the 
place and time under consideration is accepted as new. Thus, any past disclosure, to be 
understood as any revelation, written or oral, express or implicit, including that which is known 
through usage, will limit the innovative character and exclude a product or a process from being 
patented. Similarly, prior art can encompass past patent applications not yet published and limit 
the eligibility of a patent application. Finally, knowledge of local communities, traditional 
practices can be included in prior art and on this basis become non patentable.  
Second condition, the innovation should be inventive, which corresponds to the “non-obvious” 
criteria. It is a filter, which makes it possible to refuse the grant of a monopoly for processes and 
products that are based neither on intelligence nor on any particular creative activity. The act of 
inventing is generally understood to have been achieved if, for a person skilled in the art, the 
invention does not obviously follow prior art.  
Third condition, invention is “capable of industrial application” (Article 27.1). Here too, the 
agreement does not provide any details, thereby giving the States sufficient room for manoeuvre. 
This criterion is generally understood to be a means to ensure that the monopoly is granted solely 
to processes and products likely to result in material manufacture of a product and industrial 
production.  
Last condition, supposing that the invention is new, inventive and capable of industrial 
application, “Members shall require that an applicant shall disclose the invention in a manner 
sufficiently clear and complete for an invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art and 
may require the applicant to indicate the best mode for carrying out the invention known to the 
inventor at the filing date” (Article 29)16. Therefore, the product features shall be described in the 
 
16 The applicant can also be asked to give details of all the biological sources involved in the invention. Thus, by 
ensuring respect for the 1992 Biological Diversity Convention (BDC) clauses, biopiracy can be curbed. Further, by 
proclaiming the States’ sovereignty over national resources, the agreement aims at preserving traditional knowledge 
and biological diversity. Therefore, the applicant has to be capable of proving that the materials’ country of origin 
had given its prior informed consent as per the regulation in force in that country. This also helps in ensuring the 
creation of a just and equitable system of sharing benefits resulting from the use and marketing of this material. For 
problems of articulation between the TRIPS agreement and the 1992 convention, cf. Chapman (2002).  
patent application and made public. Disclosure is an indispensable factor in the contract drawn 
between the inventor and the society. In fact, in exchange for the grant of monopoly, the 
applicant shall make public the technical information that helps technology progress and 
guarantee that after the patent’s expiry, the invention shall truly fall in the public domain. After 
the patent’s expiry, based on the information disclosed by the applicant, it will become possible 
for professionals in that sector to easily copy the concerned process or product, without having to 
display any creativity on their part. In addition, a clear and complete disclosure helps in 
restraining the patent’s scope. A clear and complete description limits excessive claims from the 
applicant, which, consequently, avoids the grant of a sweeping monopoly liable to stifle 
competition to a great degree.  
3.3. Limitations to patentability  
On the grounds of public order or morality, Article 27.2 provides that “Members may 
exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of the commercial 
exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provided that such 
exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law“. The notion of 
public order is, however, not defined in the agreement. Room for manoeuvre is thus available to 
the Member-States to meet their particular ends. Thus, it is possible to exclude certain drugs from 
patentability for reasons of public health. However, these exclusions can be contemplated only 
under exceptional circumstances, subjected to the limitation laid down in the article that such 
restrictions can be applied only to inventions “the prevention of the commercial exploitation of 
which is necessary”17. In any case, an object cannot be declared as non-patentable, if its 
distribution or sale has been authorised in the national territory at the same time.  
Medical methods. Article 27.3a authorises the Member-States to exclude from patentability 
“diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals”. Such an 
exclusion is of great importance to developing countries inasmuch as the patenting of these 
methods may have repercussions on public health and reduce accessibility to healthcare.  
Diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods or plants and animals and biological 
processes for the production of plants or animals. Under the terms of Article 27.3b, ”plants 
and animals and other micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of 
plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes” can be excluded from 
patentability. In this matter, the latitude granted to the States is limited by the obligation to patent 
micro-organisms. Now, inventions concerning micro-organisms are common and useful in the 
pharmaceutical industry. For example, a surgical sequence or a new medical test can be excluded 
from patentability in that it is a diagnostic, therapeutic or surgical method. On the other hand, 
medicines can be patented as a microbiological process (antibiotic) or simply a chemical process 
used for therapeutic purposes. In all these scenarios, they are not considered as therapeutic 
methods (Luff, 2004).  
On account of public health, nutrition and public interest. Article 8.1 allows certain 
pharmaceutical products to be excluded from patentability. This clause permits the Member 
States to adapt their national policies based on public health concerns. It is thus possible to 
exclude from patentability certain pharmaceutical products, as a temporary measure, to deal with 
a national emergency as far as public health is concerned. However, the article sets limits to such 
 
17 For the interpretation of the necessity criterion refer to Luff (2004). 
measures by specifying that they must be indispensable and consistent with the agreement. These 
possibilities would thus be limited by nature and their use would require justification. These 
provisions complement article 7 according to which IPR “should contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual 
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to 
social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.” On principle, protection 
of patent rights should, thus, be commensurate with the interest of the society and should 
establish “social and economic welfare”. To do so, additional and necessary measures can be 
taken under the terms of Article 8.  
3.4. Limits to the rights ensuing from the patent  
In accordance to the principles laid down by the TRIPS agreement, a country can disregard the 
rights of the patent holder to promote public health objectives such as accessibility to medicines 
or for treatment in case of national emergencies such as an epidemic. Once the patent has been 
granted, WTO members are permitted to waive the protection conferred by the patent under 
circumstances that have been provided and enshrined in the agreement.  
The general principle of exceptions to rights conferred. As per Article 30, the patent owner 
enjoys monopoly over the product or process, with certain exclusive rights. Basically these rights 
pertain to the right to forbid a third party to manufacture and use the patented product or exploit 
the patented process, to sell or offer for sale patented products and products derived from the 
patented process and finally to import these products. Patent owners shall also have the right to 
assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and to conclude licensing contracts (Article 28)18.
These rights are not without limits. In this regard, Article 30 leaves a certain latitude to the 
Member-States to provide for “exceptions” to patentee’s rights, under the following three 
conditions: “Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a 
patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of 
the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking 
account of the legitimate interests of third parties.” The aim of these exceptions is to create a 
competitive environment favourable to a decrease in drug prices and enhancement of people’s 
access to medicines. However, the three conditions are cumulative, each being a separate and 
independent requirement that must be satisfied. “Failure to comply with any one of the three 
conditions results in the Article 30 exception being disallowed”, as underlined by the Panel in the 
Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products case19.
Exception for research and experiment and specific provision. Some countries allow 
manufacturers of generic drugs to use the patented invention to obtain marketing approval 
without the patent owner’s permission and before the patent protection expires. The generic 
producers can then market their versions as soon as the patent expires. In addition, by allowing 
researchers to use a patented invention for experimental purposes, third parties are encouraged to 
work on or around the invention to understand it better and possibly surpass it. The declared 
purpose is to advance technological progress. This pharmaceutical sector specific provision, 
inherited from the American IPR regime, is called the “Bolar” provision. It has been covered in 
 
18 The patent holder enjoys the rights of use of the product or the process (usus), the voluntary right of disposal of the 
said product or process (abusus) and the right to enjoy the benefits (fructus) (Mfuka, 2002). 
19 Report of the Panel, Canada – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, 17 March 2000, 
§7.20. 
Article 8 of the TRIPS agreement and confirmed by a WTO’s Panel report adopted by the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)20.
Extemporaneous preparation of medicines. This enables a pharmaceutical board to authorise 
the preparation of a compounded mixture, in units, to meet the needs of a particular patient’s 
medical prescription. Only this particular case is dealt with in this exception. Thus, it has a 
limited scope of application and is of lesser interest compared to the applications accepted in the 
Bolar provision.  
Compulsory licensing21. In accordance with Articles 8 and 40 of the TRIPS agreement, 
governments can take steps to prevent patent owners from abusing their rights, by 
“unreasonably” restraining trade or hampering the international transfer of technology. In 
practice, public authorities can authorise a third party to manufacture a patented product or to use 
the patented process without the patent owner’s consent. Most developed countries and 
developing countries provide for CL concession in their legislation22.  
Recourse to CL is based on Article 31 of the TRIPS agreement devoted to “other uses without 
authorization of the right holder”. The article aims to strike a balance between the concern to 
promote access to medicines and provide protection/incentive for R&D in the pharmaceutical 
field (Luff, 2004). The objective is to create a more competitive environment without, however, 
ignoring the rights of the patent owner, who ought to be adequately compensated whatever the 
circumstances.  
It is possible to issue a CL under certain conditions to ensure that the legitimate interests of the 
patent owner have been protected23. In particular, an attempt should have been made to obtain a 
voluntary license (VL) from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms (Article 31.b)24.
However, this article provides for making the VL redundant in case of a national emergency, 
circumstances of extreme urgency, public non-commercial use (or government use) or anti-
competitive practices. The CL is of particular importance for developing countries that are 
subject to epidemics such as HIV/AIDS. Their objective is to improve patients’ access to drugs. 
Thus, certain countries see this as a means to stymie the negative effects of patents on prices and 
availability of medicines, insofar as it makes it possible to reduce prices of drugs protected by a 
patent in force and to obtain technology.  
 
20 Report of the Panel, Canada – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, 17 March 2000, 
§4.15. 
21 For a critical legal review of the notion of CL, refer to Matsushita and alii. (2003).  
22 Besides, as can be seen from the anthrax episode, which pitted the American public authorities against Bayer that 
held the patent.  
23 Article 31 of the Agreement sets out to determine, as accurately as possible, a framework for the CL regime. The 
list of conditions for the use of CL consists particularly of the following points: authorisation to use without the 
patent owner’s consent should be reviewed based on the circumstances peculiar to this problem; a voluntary license 
should have been requested from the patent owner, at reasonable commercial conditions and within a reasonable 
period of time (except in times of national emergencies or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of 
public non-commercial use purposes) ; the CL’s scope and the duration should be limited to the purpose for which it 
was authorised; its use should be non-exclusive; the use is authorised mainly for replenishment of the domestic 
market of the member state that granted this license; the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the 
circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization and the remunerations are 
likely to be revised.  
24 A VL means that the patent holder has given his consent to a local company to copy the concerned drug, against 
royalty payments, which shall be marketed only in the internal market.  
Nevertheless, certain difficulties continue to exist. First of all, the lacks of a clear definition of 
these scenarios and the resultant legal insecurity have led developing countries to demand a 
specific statement on this matter. Further, a CL is normally granted mainly to replenish the local 
market. So what about developing countries reeling under a national emergency or victim of a 
monopolistic practice who do not have local manufacturing capacities?  
Parallel import (PI). PI allows imports and resale in a country without the authorisation of 
the patent owner of a product patented and marketed in another country by the patent owner 
himself or through a duly authorised agent. This measure also stems from the concern to strike a 
balance between adherence to the patentee’s monopoly and the principle of free flow, in order to 
create as competitive as possible an environment. In practice, this has to do with drugs produced 
and marketed by the patent owner in one country that are subsequently exported to another 
country without his permission. Thus, if a drug X has been patented and manufactured in 
countries A and B and if the price of the drug is cheaper in country A, then country B would be 
tempted to import the drug from country A to benefit from a lower price. This practice is known 
as parallel import25.
Recourse to PI is governed by the principle of exhaustion of rights retained by the Members. 
Exhaustion of rights can be at the national, regional or international level. According to the 
principle of exhaustion of rights at the national level, the patent owner’s rights are considered to 
have fulfilled their objective once the patent owner has marketed the product anywhere in the 
national territory. This means that the patentee no longer holds any rights over his product’s 
subsequent sale and resale, his rights having been “exhausted”, once it has been marketed. 
However, marketing of his product outside the national territory does not exhaust his rights. In 
other words, exporting the product, to a third country is prohibited. This system is in force 
especially in the United States. At the regional level, there is exhaustion of rights the moment the 
product is put up for sale in the regional market. This mechanism also prevails in the European 
market, which for example allows a product marketed on Spanish soil to be subsequently 
exported to another European Union member country. Finally, at the international level, once the 
patent holder consents to market his product in one country, the international exhaustion of his 
rights takes place: the product can be exported to any other country without the consent of the 
patentee. As a result, if the principle of exhaustion of rights at the international level is retained, 
as soon as the patent holding company has sold its product in country A, its rights are exhausted 
as regards all other countries and therefore all other markets; country B can then proceed to 
imports from a more competitive source of supply.  
On this point the TRIPS agreement lays down that “nothing in this Agreement shall be used to 
address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights” (Article 6). By its refusal to 
arbitrate, the WTO thus gives wide latitude to Members to legislate. As a result, if a country 
authorises PIs based on modalities that infringe on the agreement, the matter cannot be brought 
before the WTO’s DSB, unless the fundamental principles of non-discrimination are at issue 
under the terms of Article 6 of the agreement.  
At the end of this overview, we can ascertain that the TRIPS agreement controls a certain 
number of factors. For example, product and process patents have a lifespan of minimum twenty 
years. Nevertheless, the agreement leaves other more or less important factors to the discretion of 
 
25 Trade practice, which, in extreme cases, results in the reshipment of those drugs that MNCs sell at preferential 
tariffs in developing countries, to developed countries to be sold at a higher price by smugglers.  
the Members. In particular, a State must define what constitutes a national emergency or the 
choice of the principle of exhaustion rights to be retained. And finally, in the case of India, for 
instance, there are many differences between the IPR regime based on the TRIPS agreement and 
the IPR regime inherited from the 1970 IPA. These have been summarised in the table given 
below.  
1970 Indian Patent Act TRIPS agreement 
Patents only on processes in the 
pharmaceutical sector. 
Fields in which patenting has been excluded: 
nuclear, agriculture. 
Patent duration: 7 years in the chemical and 
pharmacy sectors from filing of application 
and 14 years in other sectors. 
Discrimination: Patent valid in case of local 
manufacture. 
Compulsory licensing, Parallel imports and 
other assignment of rights. 
Patents on processes and products. 
Fields in which patenting has been excluded: 
diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods 
for treating humans or animals. 
Patent duration: minimum 20 years from 
filing for patent. 
Discrimination: Patent valid for both local 
manufacture and imports. 
Statutory license.  
Parallel imports not excluded. 
According to the TRIPS agreement, the following falls under the States’ discretion  
National emergency 
Exhaustion of rights (at national, regional or international level). 
4. Ensuring the TRIPs-Conformity of Indian IPR law 
4.1. Determination of Non-Conformity by the Dispute Settlement Body  
The WTO system imposes stiff conditions regarding conformity to the international trade law. 
Any national law must conform to WTO requirements and this requirement for conformity of the 
national law with the WTO law is something quite unique in international public law (Chaisse, 
2005). All the WTO Members must then implement the TRIPS agreement. Indeed, Article XVI.4 
of the agreement lays down that “each Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, 
regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed 
agreements”. Also, WTO Members must provide for civil and administrative procedures for the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights to holders. As had been pointed out earlier, the 
agreement provides for a moratorium for developing countries. For the least advanced countries, 
the agreement should be ratified before 1st January 2016. For other developing countries, the 
ratification must take place before 1st January 2005. Despite repeated protests, India was placed 
in the other developing countries’ category. In fact, a low per capita income ($530) places it 
among low-income countries. However, it appears that India was done in by the demographic 
factor. Its high population was put forward as a reason for justifying its classification under the 
other developing countries’ category. Therefore, it is obliged to amend its national laws 
pertaining to patenting in order to comply with the TRIPS agreement by 2005.  
Apart from the discussions regarding the time frame granted to one or the other category for 
compliance with the TRIPS agreement, other difficulties too surfaced. They concern the violation 
and interpretation of certain provisions in the agreement. In this respect, the key element in the 
WTO is its DSB, which does exert a considerable influence on world trade and diplomacy 
(Chaisse, 2006). Its aim is to maintain the judicial rights and obligations of each of the WTO 
Members. Moreover, unlike other judicial systems of this type, its mechanism is based on a large 
jurisprudence that clarifies and develops laws that stem from the Marrakech agreement. On the 
whole, more than any other international organisation, the WTO is truly capable of ensuring the 
effectiveness of all its regulations laid down in the agreement it administrates. The immediate 
consequence of such a system is that the developing countries take frequent recourse to this 
dispute settlement mechanism, bringing before it litigation against developed countries as well as 
other developing countries (Chaisse & Chakraborty, 2006). In fact, with the establishment of the 
WTO, dispute settlement under international trade laws has become judicial and much more 
efficient26. An important feature of the DSB system is that it has mandatory jurisdiction over all 
disputes arising out of the WTO agreement. The Members cannot take recourse to any other 
process to settle disputes. In other words, litigation is centralised within a single body, which de 
facto results in the creation of a homogeneous jurisprudence. Finally, it must be underlined that 
once a report has been adopted, all the parties involved in the dispute must accept all its elements, 
which means that the “loser” must make its legislation compatible with WTO laws as expressed 
and explained in the DSB report. This far-reaching change has surely made the DSB one of the 
most effective mechanism in international law even if some improvements are still necessary 
(Chaisse & Chakraborty, 2004).  
In the field of IPR and with regard to India in particular, we have already confirmed the 
important role played by the DSB. As examined earlier, with the amendment made to the IPA in 
1970, India did not grant patent protection for pharmaceutical products when the TRIPS 
agreement came into force. But, Article 70.8 states the obligation to create a system by which 
patent applications can be filed for such inventions. This provision is generally known as “mail 
box application” and generated the “India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products” case which is the first litigation on intellectual property settled 
within the WTO framework. Regarding the conformity with Article 70.8 TRIPS, the DSB noted 
that “the absence of judicial security in the functioning of the mail box system in India [was] 
such that the system did not [permit] Article 70.8 to be fulfilled appropriately and protect the 
legitimate expectations implied for the pharmaceutical products and agricultural related chemical 
products inventors”27. The DSB did not fail to support its argument by observing that 
“foreseeability as regards the intellectual property regime is essential for citizens of WTO 
countries when they take decisions pertaining to trade and investment in their commercial 
transactions”28. Subsequently, this analysis was by and large confirmed. It added that members 
 
26 The GATT’s effectiveness in settling disputes was limited, since the agreement (consensus) of all contracting 
parties was required for adopting a report (judgement) formulated to settle a case. The expected refusal from the 
losing party was sufficient to stop the adoption of the report. With WTO, the consensus rule has been reversed: 
henceforth a unanimous decision is necessary to reject a report (negative consensus). In other words, a report can 
only be rejected if the “winning” State rejects a decision given in its favour by the DSB, a hypothesis that has never 
come true since 1995. 
27 Report of the Panel, India - Protection granted by a patent for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products,
WT/DS79/R, 24 August 1998, §7.41.  
28 Report of the Panel, India - Protection granted by a patent for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products,
WT/DS79/R, 24 August 1998, §7.30. 
were not obliged to guarantee that patent applications deposited in the mail box would not be 
rejected or invalidated because they preceded the enforcement of any legislation. Merely, 
subject sets up a judicial mechanism based on the “mailbox system”29. It did not in any way 
challenge India’s right, by virtue of the transitional provisions in paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of Article 
65, to defer the implementation of Article 27 pertaining to patents on pharmaceutical and 
agricultural chemical products until 1st January 2005.  
4.2. 1995-2005: India’s sluggish approach on patent law compliance 
After having signed the agreement, between 1994 and 1998, and despite the bilateral and 
multilateral trade pressures exerted by the United States and Europe, India did not amend its IPR 
regime. The sluggishness evidenced was due to the opposition of players who benefited from the 
IPR regime inherited from the 1970 IPA. In particular, the generic drug manufacturer Cipla 
continues to plead in favour of a moratorium extending up to 2015. It is demanding that India be 
classified under the list of the least advanced countries regardless of its large population. Another 
example of India’s sluggishness pertains to a bill introduced in Parliament in March 1995 to 
amend the 1970 IPA. This bill was not approved by the Parliament and was sent back to a 
committee. It is only from 1998 onwards that there have been significant changes.  
On that date, the political parties changed their position under the delayed effect of the 
liberalisation policy initiated in 1991 (Ramanna, 2002). The Congress Party changed its stance in 
favour of amending the IPR regime. On its part, having come to power in 1998, the BJP went on 
record that it is for the establishment of a stronger IPR regime. At the same time, the lobbies also 
geared up. The Confederation of Indian Industry ensured that the IPR reform would help the 
country attract foreign direct investments (FDI) and gain access to new technologies, a factor 
necessary for a modern and professional management of the Indian industry, according to this 
body. The Federation of Indian Chambers of Industry and Commerce set up the International 
Institute of Intellectual Property Development in 1997. The latter has launched a campaign with 
the slogan “patent or perish”. The public scientific bodies have taken a positive view at the 
possibility of patenting the knowledge they have developed. Following the lead given by the 
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, these bodies have declared their support for 
strengthening the patent laws. Finally, in 1998, following a complaint brought to the DSB by the 
United States, India was asked ensure compliance of its legislation as of April 1999. 
As the first sign of an effective modification of patent laws, India signed the Paris Convention 
on 8th December 1998 and ratified the Patent Cooperation Treaty (Kumar, 1998). In 1998, the 
BJP introduced a motion for amending the patent law. In 1999, the first amendment was adopted 
(Watal, 2001, Bhattacharya, 2002, Chaudhuri, 2002). It authorised product patenting in agro-
chemical and pharmaceutical sectors. Patent applications could thus be deposited in a “mail-box”. 
The applications would be reviewed in 2004 and could be possibly accepted in 2005. Since the 
TRIPS agreement came into force in 1995, only those molecules that were discovered and were 
the subject of patent applications in another WTO Member after this date are patentable. Thus, 
the countries would have to ensure in 2005 that applications filed are indeed for drugs invented 
after 1995. In addition, as provided in the TRIPS agreement for the transition period, exclusive 
marketing rights could be granted for 5 years to companies that file their application under certain 
conditions.  
 
29 Report of the Appellate Body, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products,
WT/DS50/AB/R, 19 December 1997, §57-71. 
In May 2001, India was placed under the “Special 301 Priority Watch List”, an instrument the 
United States employs to exert trade pressures on countries that adversely affect their economic 
interests either by adopting protectionist measures or by not bringing about a desirable change in 
their IPR regime. In 2002, a new amendment was adopted. Amongst other issues, it provides 
greater clarification about the definition of the term “invention”, non-patentable elements, patent 
owner’s rights, CL and even PI (Bhattacharya, 2002, Keayla, 2003).  
In short, making its legislation fall in line with the TRIPS agreement was not a smooth process 
for India and much still needs to be done. Based on the points presented above concerning the 
history of patent protection in India and its pharmaceutical industry, we can understand better the 
reticence shown in this matter by the public authorities. The implementation of the TRIPS 
agreement constitutes a renewed fortification of patent protection. Thus, the country fears that 
this renewed fortification would apply the brakes on the growth its industry had enjoyed till now 
and eat into the progress achieved towards self-sufficiency in healthcare and peoples’ access to 
medicines. Furthermore, Thailand’s experience, another country that had to bring about 
strengthening of patent protection earlier, has put the promises associated with TRIPS ratification 
in a different perspective.  
5. Prospects of reinforcement of legal pharmaceutical patent system in developing 
countries  
When the TRIPS agreement was being ratified, the developed countries had repeatedly 
stressed on the fact that the developing countries too would benefit by strengthening their IPR 
regime. First of all, it was stated that a strong IPR regime would promote FDI and technology 
transfer, which would at last help the developing countries stimulate their industrial growth and 
gain access to the latest therapeutic innovations (Correa, 2001a, 2002b). Then, it was stated that 
public health objectives would not be threatened by the TRIPS agreement insofar as exceptions 
had been built in to deal with medical emergencies or to remedy abusive trade practices such as 
market rationing or fixing of prohibitive prices. What has happened with these promises?  
5.1. Two different paths followed by developing countries: lessons learnt  
First and foremost, let us recall that the analysis revealed that the Indian pharmaceutical 
industry’s growth curve was largely due to the relaxation of its IPR regime. By switching from a 
stringent IPR regime to a more flexible one in 1970, the Indian authorities managed to ensure 
their pharmaceutical industry’s growth and improve accessibility to medicines. Furthermore, the 
growth of the domestic Indian industry does present definite benefits for the rest of the world as 
suggested by the impact of the competition war unleashed between MNCs and Indian generic 
drug manufacturers in the ARV market (Guennif, 2004, Guennif & Mfuka, 2005). In this sense, 
this industry has helped to improve global welfare by offering treatment at more affordable prices 
to persons infected by HIV/AIDS.  
Moreover, Thailand’s experience in this matter is enlightening. The country took the opposite 
path compared to India’s journey by strengthening its IPR regime as early as 1992 under US 
trade pressures and subsequently due to the ratification of the TRIPS agreement. To this date, if 
the benefits of this reinforcement remain hard to pinpoint as regards FDI and transfer of 
technology, the disadvantages in terms of patients’ access to treatments are, on the contrary, 
clearly perceptible.  
In fact, as regards FDI and transfer of technology, it seems that between 1984 and 1998, 
Thailand companies remained mostly in the hands of Thai nationals (Supakankunti & alii, 2001). 
Therefore, it appears that there was very little FDI inflow in the local pharmaceutical industry 
since 1992. If the FDI amount increased by very little, it is because MNCs preferred to import 
rather than manufacture medicines locally as is evident from the growing share of imported 
medicines in Thailand since 1992. In real terms, following the amendment of patent laws, the 
imported products’ share in the local drug market was 42.8% in 1999 as against 23.5% in 1984. 
In short, having obtained patents on drugs and not being bound to make actual use of their patents 
in the form of local manufacturing, the MNCs were tempted to simply take advantage of existing 
formulation capacity in the country (Guennif & Mfuka, 2003a, 2003b) and very rarely promoted 
technology transfers to the country.  
As regards accessibility to treatment, between 1979 and 1992, a generic medicine usually 
became available in the market 1 or 2 years after the launch of the brand-name drug. However, 
following the strengthening of the IPR regime in 1992, a generic version could be made available 
only 5 years after filing of patent (Kwa, 2001). Thailand also experienced great difficulties in 
meeting public health objectives when for example the HIV/AIDS epidemic had to be dealt with 
and patients’ access to treatment facilitated. The “ddl affair” is a perfect example of the 
magnitude of these difficulties. Ddl is an ARV whose patent is held by the American company 
Bristol-Myers & Squibb (BMS). Having managed to develop a generic version of ddl, the public 
sector unit, GPO, under the aegis of the Thai Health Ministry, was forced to stop marketing this 
drug due to the modification in the Thai Patent Act and the introduction of patents on processes 
and products. For want of a generic version, ddl became an inaccessible drug for infected 
persons: it was offered for $0.5 a pill by BMS whereas GPO had sold it for $0.15 in 2001 
(Guennif & Mfuka, 2003a, 2003b). Not willing to give up, in 1997, GPO filed a request for a CL 
in view of the national emergency created by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. BMS then exerted 
pressure on its government, which in its turn interceded with the Thai authorities. Under 
commercial pressure30, the Thai Government had to give in and refuse the grant of the CL. In 
2001, an association of people living with HIV/AIDS sued BMS and asked for the revocation of 
its patent for lack of significant inventive steps or novelty. Since then, the patent was not 
invalided but its scope reduced so that GPO could produce tablet larger than 100mg dosage form 
(Oxfam, 2004). The generic was marketed at half price of the brand-name drug. At the end, under 
the pressure of the civil society, BMS gave up its patent.  
After all, in response to the question whether a stringent IPR regime promotes transfer of 
technology and improves accessibility to medicines, the past Indian experience and the present 
Thai experience would raise serious doubts. Of much more concern is the recourse to exceptions 
provided for by the TRIPS agreement in theory, which remains problematic, especially when we 
take into account the developing countries’ place in world trade and the import of trade pressures 
emanating from the developed world.  
5.2. Room for manoeuvre for India and developing countries?  
How can we ensure that patent protection does not impede access to medicines in poor 
countries, while at the same time preserving the patent’s incentive role in the R&D field? A 
compromise seems difficult to reach. The developed countries are clearly at an advantage with 
respect to the developing countries (Ramappa, 2000). As a matter of fact, the industrialised 
nations, cradles of pharmaceutical firms that are patentees of most drugs, are the main exporters 
of both processes and products. It is natural that their interest lies in a stringent protective IPR 
 
30 The United States used “Special 301” against Thailand too.  
regime in as many countries as possible. The TRIPS agreement affords them this protection and 
therefore further strengthens the MNCs’ predominant position and their income throughout the 
world31.
On the other hand, the developing countries are, for the most part, importers of both processes 
and products. They are likely to be subjected to a rise in prices for imported patented drugs. At 
the same time, the market launch of generic drugs, which provoke a significant drop in prices, 
would be delayed due to the extension of the protection period granted by the patent. 
Consequently, there is already a fear of foreign monopolies in the domestic market and the 
transfer of profits to industrialised nations, as well as a loss of public control over drug prices, 
promotional campaigns and national drugs policy. It will then become very difficult for 
developing countries to protect their imperatives for public health – imperatives that had been put 
forward in the objectives and principles of the TRIPS agreement (Articles 7, 8.1 & 8.2) and 
reaffirmed at Doha (Article 4).  
In fact, given the difficulties and pressures encountered by developing countries in making 
effective use of flexibilities provided for in the TRIPS agreement, the Members at first reaffirmed 
at Doha their commitment to the principle of IPR protection as the driving force behind 
innovation: “We recognize that intellectual property protection is important for the development 
of new medicines.” (Article 2 of the Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health 
adopted on 14th November 2001 at Doha). Then, it was reiterated that the principle of IPR 
protection was subordinate to the principle of public health: “We agree that the TRIPS 
Agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking measures to protect public 
health”, (….), “Accordingly, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and 
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health and, in 
particular, to promote access to medicines for all.” (Doha Declaration, paragraph 4). It was thus 
that the possibility available to the Members to take recourse to PI and CL in case of national 
emergencies, and the sole discretion to define what “constitutes a national emergency” was 
reaffirmed (Paragraphs 5b and 5c). On the one hand, each State was left free to establish its own 
regime of exhaustion of IPR (Paragraph 5d), which will determine the practical possibility of 
recourse to PIs at a regional or global level. However, on the other hand, faced with the 
objections raised by African countries, which were unable to take recourse to CL due to 
insufficient manufacturing capacities in their territory, the ministerial WTO conference held at 
Doha instructed the Members to find a solution before the end of 2002 (Paragraph 6). This 
proposal was rejected by, among others, the United States32.
Indeed, in August 2003, a few months before the Cancun summit, an agreement was reached 
(WTO, Press Release dated 30th August 2003). The press release provided for an additional 
flexibility: the possibility for Members to import medicines under CL. Thus, a country like 
Botswana could very well issue a CL and ask a company established in a third country (where the 
patents would possibly be recognised) to proceed with the manufacture of drugs and export them 
to its territory enabling it to deal with a national emergency such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
 
31 Besides, the proposal came at a moment when the companies were going through a serious crisis. Whereas the 
R&D programmes were becoming costlier by the day, the number of molecules being patented was decreasing 
substantially every year. To add to the woes, a large number of blockbusters were falling and would be falling in the 
public domaine, eating into the profits of corporations holding patents that had expired or were about to expire 
(www.cptech.org, Pignarre, 2001).  
32 For a presentation on the Indian position, refer to Sen (2001).  
Further, the WTO General Council’s President’s statement laid down a series of undertakings to 
avoid possible abuse and committing the country to use this mechanism in “good faith”. The 
statement aimed at reassuring the United States about the unjustified use of the notion of national 
emergency as a cover for commercial interests. Similarly, the CL issued by exporting Members 
would set out a series of strict conditions: a predetermined production volume, unequivocal 
identification of products, notification of these conditions and the country of consignment as well 
as adequate remuneration to the patent owner as provided for in Article 31h of the TRIPS 
agreement. All in all, since the Uruguay Round, though not reversed, a distinct change had taken 
place in the balance of power between developed countries and developing countries, as evidence 
by the Doha declaration adopted on 14th November 2001 and the agreement reached in August 
2003.  
Finally, in the matter of treatment accessibility, it must be added there is yet some more room 
for manoeuvre for developing countries in general, and India in particular. There is nothing in the 
TRIPs agreement that prohibits Member from taking institutional price control measures once the 
principles of national treatment and the most-favoured nation treatment have been met. Indeed, in 
France, such price control processes do exist. On the one hand, drugs are classified either as 
reimbursable medicines or as non-reimbursable medicines. On the other hand, negotiations 
between the public authorities and pharmaceutical companies are arranged to fix the prices of the 
first category of drugs. Thus, in order to control its health expenditure and unlike the United 
States, France has learnt to maintain a balance between compliance to patent laws and controlling 
public healthcare expenditure.  
For all that, recourse to both the flexibilities contained in the TRIPS agreement and effective 
price control measures presupposes a very strong political will on the part of Indian authorities as 
well as adequate economic ability to withstand trade pressures from developed countries. Indeed, 
the last amendments of the patent law made in 2005 indicate that India is strongly committed to 
the protection of public health within its territory, and abroad. On one side, the scope of 
patentability was restricted. As a consequence, new forms and new uses of a known drug are not 
patentable. Additionally, a pre-grant opposition is provided: people can oppose a patent 
application filed by a firm. Due to these two provisions, Novartis was denied market exclusivity 
rights for its Gleevec in 2005. The Patent Controllers state that Gleevec was not a new drug but a 
new use of a previously known drug. Presently, Novartis is challenging the decision. Besides, 
numbers of NGOs oppose the patent application filed by the firm Gilead on Tenofovir (an anti-
AIDS medicine) on the same ground. NGOs are willing so to ensure patients’ access to this 
essential ARV. Earlier, an opposition was made to GlaxoSmithKline’s exclusive market rights on 
Combivir, an anti-AIDS bi-therapy. Since then, Gilead announced its intention to grant voluntary 
licenses to Indian manufacturers for Tenofovir … after obtaining a patent in India. On the other 
side, India has amended its patent law in order to allow exportation of drugs produced under 
compulsory licence. Thus, domestic firms can produce patented drugs and export low-cost 
generics to an African country for instance, as soon as other regulatory conditions are met.  
6. Conclusion  
The IPR regime adopted by any country is essentially a tool that strives to ensure both the 
growth of the domestic pharmaceutical industry and people’s access to medicines. But, contrary 
to the very easily advanced theory, there is no paradox between the two. From this perspective, 
the Indian experience has shown that it is precisely the relaxation of its national IPR regime that 
promoted the growth of its domestic industry, thereby ensuring a better patient access to 
medicines. However, the globalisation process does not overlook any sector, which means that 
medicines too are submitted to the new legal framework established within the WTO. 
Confronted with this new framework, which constitutes a reinforcement of the legal patent 
system the world over, India is witnessing a reappraisal of its industry and as a corollary, of 
patients’ access to medicines. The problematic of self-sufficiency in healthcare has resurfaced 
with the danger of India once again becoming dependant on foreign products, which are 
themselves fortified by guarantees granted at the international level. It is the main stance taken by 
some developing countries, which would like the WTO to acknowledge the priority of patient 
care over drug manufacturers. In other words, these countries would appreciate it if the WHO 
logic is given more evident and effective weight, for it is a logic that recommends healthcare for 
all and the recognition of health as a global public good for this new millennium (Kaul & alii, 
1999, WHO, 2001, Correa, 2001a).  
Admittedly, the Doha declaration does highlight the right to healthcare and access to 
medicines, but the international rules as they exist today are still markedly in favour of 
manufacturing in developed countries to the detriment of poor countries. This is the entire point 
of the developing countries’ and in particular India’s position, who are currently engaged in fresh 
international negotiations in search of a better balance between the urgent necessity to guarantee 
the most underprivileged populations an as satisfying as possible access to medicines, especially 
to fight against epidemics, and the consideration of the drug industry’s financial compulsions. In 
any event, this problem has transcended from the national level into the international level.  
Yet, to conclude, we must add that for the past five years, far from the logic of 
“multilateralism” recommended by the WTO, the US has been going on a tour of developing 
countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia, with a view to making them sign Free trade 
agreements (FTAs). Since 2000, bilateral or regional agreements have been signed with Jordan, 
Morocco, Chile or Central America. This tendency to develop trade diplomacy out of the WTO 
system will surely be reinforced since the WTO General Council formally suspended global trade 
talks on 27th July 2006, following the collapse of last-ditch efforts to overcome divisions on farm 
supports. To that extent, the growing number of these FTAs may be much more harmful in 
matters related to strengthening of IPR protection in the world and could very well make 
economic compulsions run counter to healthcare imperatives of developing countries. More 
precisely, many provisions may undermine the recourse to TRIPS flexibilities, prevent the supply 
of generic drugs and finally damage drugs accessibility in developing countries. Among others, 
efforts are made to broaden the scope of patentability so that new forms and new therapeutic uses 
can be patented; data protection is ensured for 5 years, even 10 years; and provisions governing 
CL and PI proved to be more restrictive compared to the ones in the TRIPS agreement. To sum 
up, these provisions could well strengthen in a more than a reasonable manner the interests of the 
MNCs by ensuring the protection and the extension of monopolistic positions in developing 
countries (Cptech, 2004, Oxfam, 2004, Abbott, 2006, Guennif, 2006).  
 
------------------------------- 
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